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Contracts-ADOPTION-A FLEXIBLE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING 
WHEN A CONTRACT TO MAKE A WILL, INCIDENTAL TO AN ADOPTION 
AGREEMENT, IS VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY-Reimche v. First 
National Bank, 512 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975). 
Plaintiff, the mother of an illegitimate child, commenced 
this diversity action against the executor and legatees of the puta- 
tive father's estate. She sought specific performance of an alleged 
oral contract by the decedent to make the' plaintiff one of the 
beneficiaries of his will. This promise and other promises by the 
father to benefit the child were allegedly made in return for the 
mother's promises to consent to his adoption of the child, to never 
attempt to regain custody of the child, and to remain silent about 
the parentage of the child during the father's lifetime.' 
The Federal District Court for the District of Nevada dis- 
missed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted, finding that the contract was a sale of the child 
and void as against public p01icy.~ The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the contract was 
enforceable and did not violate public policy. 
A. Public Policy, Generally 
The concept that  a contract violative of public policy is 
unenforceable is based on the principle that one cannot lawfully 
do that which tends to be injurious to the public   elf are.^ Both 
because of the practical difficulties involved in identifying and 
defining public policy4 and because of the countervailing princi- 
- - - --- 
1. In addition, the plaintiff alleged that the contract was initiated by the decedent 
prior to the birth of the child after the decedent assured the plaintiff that his proposal 
was the best way to provide for the child and to insure that the benefits of enormous trusts 
created by decedent's forefathers inured a t  his death to  the child. Plaintiff accepted 
decedent's offer and fully performed her promises. The decedent performed all his prom- 
ises to benefit the child, but he failed to name the plaintiff as a beneficiary of his will. 
IEeimche v. First Nat'l Bank, 512 F.2d 187, 187-88 (9th Cir. 1975). 
2. Reimche v. First Nat'l Bank, Civil No. LV-1923 (D. Nev. Feb. 14, 1973) (unre- 
ported memorandum decision). 
3. Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Mo. 1959). I t  is the general tendency of 
the contract and not the result in a particular case which determines its validity. State 
ex rel. Spillman v. First Bank, 114 Neb. 423, 430, 207 N.W. 674, 676-77 (1926); Enders v. 
Enders, 164 Pa. 266, 271, 30 A. 129, 130 (1894). 
4. Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199, 205 (1927); Pendleton v. Greever, 80 Okla. 35, 
193 P. 885 (1920); Weeks v. New York Life Ins. Co., 128 S.C. 223, 226-27, 122 S.E. 586, 
587 (1924). 
Public Policy is in its nature so uncertain and fluctuating, varying with the 
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ple of freedom of contract,' the courts have generally been reluc- 
tant to invalidate a contract on public policy grounds unless the 
policy is clearly inferable from the constitution, statutes, or judi- 
cial decisions of the jurisdi~tion,~ and the effects of the agreement 
are clearly within the intended scope of the policy.' In the area 
of contracts involving surrender of child custody or consent to 
adoption, however, it is well settled that any transaction amount- 
ing in substance to the sale of a child violates public policy." 
At early common law, contracts for the transfer of child cus- 
tody were void as against public policy,' even where the consider- 
ation for the transfer was exclusively for the benefit of the child? 
This policy found expression in two broad rules: (1) children can- 
not be bought and sold,ll and, (2) parents cannot permanently 
transfer the custody of their child to another by their own acts.12 
- 
habits and fashions of the day, with the growth of commerce and the usages of 
trade, that it is difficult to determine its limits with any degree of exactness. It 
has never been defined by the courts, but has been let loose and free from 
definition in the same manner as fraud. 
Pendleton, supra, at 37, 193 P. a t  887. 
5. Baltimore and O.S.W.R. Co. v. Voight, 176 U.S. 498, 505-06 (1900); Tschirgi v. 
Merchants Nat'l Bank, 253 Iowa 682, 690, 113 N.W.2d 226, 231 (1962) (the courts should 
not emasculate the liberty of contract unless imperatively required by the public welfare). 
6. Twin City Pipeline Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1931); Weeks 
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 128 S.C. 223, 226-27, 122 S.E. 586, 587 (1924). 
7. A.C. Frost & Co. v. Couer D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 44 (1941); Twin City 
Pipeline Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1931). 
8. See, e.g., In re Estate of Shirk, 186 Kan. 311, 323-24, 350 P.2d 1, 11 (1960) ("It is 
fundamental that parents may not barter or sell their children nor may they demand 
pecuniary gain as the price of consent to adoptions. This is so inherent in the fabric of 
American law that citation of authority is unnecessary."); Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266, 
272-73, 30 A. 129, 130 (1894); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 4 583 (1931). But see id. which 
provides in subsection 2 that agreements between parents are not void if for the welfare 
of the child, and comment a which states that the entire section is inapplicable if an 
adoption is involved. 
The sale of children is also forbidden by statute in many jurisdictions. E.g., UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-15-3 (1953). For a detailed discussion of the criminal provisions in the 
Michigan adoption statute prohibiting the sale of children see M. VIRTUE, STUDY OF THE 
BASIC STRUCTURE FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES IN MICHIGAN 182-83 (1953). 
9. See, e.g., Swift v. Swift, 55 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ch. 1865) aff'd 34 L.J. Ch. 394 
(1865); Hamilton v. Hector, L.R. 6 Ch. App. 701, 704 (1871). 
10. See Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122,229 S.W. 1114 (1921) (following the early 
common law). 
11. See note 8 supra. 
12. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192-94 (1962) (agreements between parents for 
the custody of their children are not binding on the courts); Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn. 
291, 37 A. 679 (1897); Weir v. Marley, 99 Mo. 484, 12 S.W. 798 (1890). But see Clark v. 
Clark, 122 Md. 114, 118,89 A. 405, 407 (Ct. App. 1913) (welfare of the child considered to 
be more important than strict application of the old common law rule prohibiting private 
contractural transfers of custody). 
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By discouraging parents from shifting their parental responsibili- 
ties to another who had only a contractual obligation to support 
the child, but no corresponding moral obligation, it seems that 
the courts intended to protect society from additional welfare 
costs for the care of abandoned children.13 Moreover, since paren- 
tal custody rights were not considered property interests and chil- 
dren were not chattels, a child was not considered to be the proper 
subject of a contract.14 
As statutes legalizing adoption became prevalent,lE and the 
best interests of the child became the paramount concern in cases 
involving the custody of children,16 courts began enforcing con- 
tracts to give or will property to the chi1d.l7 Even in cases where 
the custody of the child is the central issue, the modern trend is 
to enforce the contract if it promotes the child's welfare.lWever- 
-- - - 
These cases suggest that the rule was primarily invoked in cases where the custody 
of the child was the central issue. See Anderson v. Anderson, 75 Kan. 117, 128, 88 P. 743, 
747 (1907) (enforcing a contract to leave property to the child even though the contract 
also provided for the transfer of child custody, where the action was not directly concerned 
with child custody). 
13. See Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266, 272-73, 30 A. 129, 130 (1894). 
14. See Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 131-32, 229 S.W. 1114, 1118 (1921); Sell, 
Custody of Children after Divorce in Pennsylvania, 10 U.  PI^. L. REV. 1, 6 (1948). 
15. Adoption was unknown a t  common law. The first adoption statutes in the United 
States were enacted in the middle of the nineteenth century. England did not provide for 
adoption in its statutes until 1926. See Presser, The Historical Background of the Ameri- 
can Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAMILY LAW 443 (1971). 
Nevada's current adoption statute provides that "If the court finds the best interests 
of the child warrant the granting of the petition, an order or decree of adoption shall be 
made and filed . . . ." NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.150 (1973). 
16. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962) ("Virginia law, like that of 
probably every state in the Union requires the court to put the child's interest first."). 
For a discussion of the development of the best interest standard and custody gener- 
ally see Oster, Custody Proceedings: A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. 
FAMILY LAW 21 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Oster]; Sell, note 14 supra at 1; 17 N.Y.L.F. 
875 (1971). The varied development of the law involved in the custody of illegitimate 
children is traced in H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971). 
For a discussion of the effects of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), on the rights 
of the unwed father in a custody hearing see Comment, Adoption Consent Rights of the 
Unwed Father in Oregon, 53 ORE. L. REV. 531 (1974). 
17. Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolff, 191 Ga. 111 , l l  S.E.2d 766 (1940) (contract 
with third party held specifically enforceable); Redmon v. Roberts, 198 N.C. 161, 150 S.E. 
881 (1929) (upholding contract between natural parents of illegitimate child); Bassett v. 
American Baptist Publication Soc'y 215 Mich. 126, 183 N.W. 747 (1921). Contra, Hooks 
v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 229 S.W. 1114 (1921) (denying specific performance of 
contract with third party on grounds that enforcement would encourage widespread sale 
of children). 
18. Crocker v. Crocker, 195 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1952). 
For a critical analysis concerning the conclusionary application by the courts of the 
"best interest" or "child's welfare standard" see Foster & Freed, Child Custody, 39 
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theless, contracts involving surrender of custody to a third party 
without reference to the child's interests or primarily for the pecu- 
niary benefit of the parent continue to be held void as against 
public policy.lg The rationale for this approach appears to be the 
strong public interest in promoting the welfare of children and in 
maintaining the natural parent-child relat i~nship.~When,  how- 
ever, it is apparent that the welfare of the child has been pro- 
moted, some courts have permitted the parent to incidentally 
benefit from the agreement notwithstanding the general rule that 
parents may not profit from the transfer of child custody to an- 
other. This narrowly construed exception has been applied only 
where the contract involved a close family compact that generally 
promoted the child's welfare and the parent relinquishing cus- 
tody was not motivated by prospects of pecuniary gain.21 
B. Nevada Public Policy 
Nothing in the Nevada constitution or statutes directly pro- 
hibits contracts for the surrender of a child to another or expressly 
makes it unlawful for the mother of an illegitimate child to inci- 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 423 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Foster &   reed]; Oster, supra note 16, a t  
22, 37-38. 
Generalizations are developed to guide the courts. To decide a question of 
custody by mere reference to these generalities without searching the specifics 
and stating such findings in the opinion is unsatisfactory. To render an opinion 
that the mother should have custody because she is fit tells us . . . nothing 
about what made this mother fit. Nor does such an opinion serve as a guide for 
the future. . . . 
Id. at 37. 
19. See, e.g., Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Hanley, 208 Ga. 34,65 S.E.2d 26 (1951) 
(denying specific performance of promise by sister-in-law to leave a legacy to the child's 
mother in return for consent to adoption); Downs v. Wortman 228 Ga. 315, 185 S.E.2d 
387 (1971) (returning custody of child to natural parents because a payment to the mother 
was against public policy and invalidated the consent); cf. Bilderback v. Clark, 106 Kan. 
737, 189 P. 977 (1920) (refusing to enforce an alleged promise to leave the estate to the 
natural heirs on the grounds that such a promise was detrimental to the welfare of the 
child and contrary to the adoption statutes). 
20. Cases cited note 19 supra. 
An additional rationale suggested by the district court in the present case is the 
fundamental "abjuration of agreements involving the barter or sale of human beings" 
provided in the anti-slavery provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment. Civil No. LV-1923, 
a t  7. 
21. See, e.g., In re Estate of Shirk, 186 Kan. 311,350 P.2d 1 (1960) (contract initiated 
by maternal grandmother to leave legacy to mother in return for consent to adoption); 
Clark v. Clark, 122 Md. 114, 89 A. 405 (1922) (contract initiated by paternal grandfather 
to pay mother's boarding expenses in return for transfer of custody); Enders v. Enders, 
164 Pa. 266, 30 A. 129 (1894) (contract initiated by paternal grandfather to give a certain 
sum of money to the mother and the child on a specified date). 
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dentally profitfrom a custody contract with the child's putative 
father. Nevertheless, the Nevada legislature has enacted a corn- 
prehensive adoption statute,22 prohibit ing unlicensed persons 
from receiving or requesting any compensation for the placement 
of children23 and providing criminal penalties for  violation^.^^ 
Natural parents, however, are exempted from the licensing re- 
q u i r e m e n t ~ ~ ~  and penalty  provision^.^^ Also, no written notice of 
a proposed placement is required by the state's welfare division 
if the "child and one of the prospective adoptive parents are 
related within the third degree of con~anquinity."~' 
The validity of a contract incidental to adoption that pro- 
vides a pecuniary benefit to the parent relinquishing custody has 
never been considered by the Nevada courts. The Nevada Su- 
preme Court in Las Vegas Sun v. Franklin,28 however, strongly 
suggested that any compensation in a black market setting which 
permitted the mother to profit from childbirth would be a sale of 
the child and against public 
In the instant case the federal district court was confronted 
with the problem of determining Nevada public policy without 
the aid of specific legislative pronouncement or prior judicial de- 
cisions. In concluding that  there was a Nevada public policy 
against the receipt of any compensation for the placement of a 
child, the district court reasoned that the statutes prohibiting any 
unlicensed person from receiving compensation for the placement 
22. NEV. REV. STAT. $ 4  127.005 et seq. (1973). 
23. Id. 4 127.290. 
24. Id. § 127.300. 
25. Id. 4 127.240. 
26. Id. 4 127.300. 
27. Id. $3 127.280. 
28. 74 Nev. 282, 329 P.2d 867 (1958). 
29. Id. at  291-92, 329 P.2d at 872. This was a libel action in which the Nevada 
Supreme Court held that an accusation that an attorney participated in the black market 
sale of a child was libel per se. Commenting on the asserted defense of truth because the 
mother had been paid for her hospital expenses and lost wages during confinement, the 
court said: 
We shall not disturb their [the jury's] determination . . . that such compensa- 
tion did not constitute the transaction a sale. There is nothing to indicate that 
the payment permitted the mother to profit from childbirth. To the contrary, 
it  would seem to have been intended simply to prevent her confinement from 
resulting in pecuniary loss. 
Id. 
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of a child literally applied to the plaintiff." The Nevada Supreme 
Court's language in Las Vegas Sun v. Franklin provided a nega- 
tive inference that the Nevada courts would consider any transac- 
tion which permitted the mother to profit from childbirth a sale 
of the child and void as against public policy." This conclusion 
accorded with the weight of authority in other  jurisdiction^."^ 
Admittedly, there existed a narrowly construed exception allow- 
ing a parent to receive incidental profits under special circum- 
stances, but that exception did not properly apply in the instant 
case .33 
Since the promise to make a will for the mother's benefit was 
held by the district court to violate public policy, the dismissal 
of the complaint was further justified by the principle of divisibil- 
ity of contract." The agreement was a partially executed, unilat- 
eral contract containing a number of promises made by the father 
solely in consideration for the mother's consent to adoption."" 
Since the only unperformed promise was the unlawful promise to 
the mother, the district court reasoned that it should leave the 
parties where it found them. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that no 
Nevada public policy against adoption agreements between. the 
natural parents could reasonably be inferred from the state con- 
30. Civil No. LV-1923, a t  4-5. 
31. Id. a t  5. 
32. Id. (citing 59 AM. JUR. 2d Parent & Child 4 34 (1971)). But  see 59 AM. JUR. 2d 
Parent & Child 4 37 (1971). Apparently the district court failed to distinguish between 
(1) cases in which a parent attempts to regain custody of his child after contracting for 
the child's transfer to a third party and (2) cases in which the parent attempts to enforce 
an incidental promise made by the other party to leave property or money to the parent 
or the child in return for the transfer of custody. The section relied on by the district court 
merely indicates that in the first category of cases, where custody of the child is the main 
issue, the courts do not hold themselves bound by private custody contracts. See notes 12 
and 18 supra. On the other hand, section 37 seems to indicate that in the second category, 
where enforcement of an incidental promise is the central issue, the courts are more 
concerned with the rule that children cannot be bought and sold. Even though concerned 
with that rule, however, the courts do not always apply it automatically to invalidate a 
contract. Some contracts requiring the party acquiring custody to leave money or property 
to the child or to the parent surrendering custody have been judicially enforced. See note 
21 and accompanying text supra. 
33. Civil No. LV-1923, a t  6. 
34. Id. at 7. 
35. Id. a t  6-7. The plaintiff, however, alleged that the contract was bilateral, dece- 
dent's promises being made in return for her promises, and that more consideration was 
given than just the promise to consent to adoption. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint a t  8. 
The court concluded that decedent could not have compelled the mother to perform in 
light of its finding that an indivisible part of the promised consideration was illegal. Civil 
No. LV-1923, at 7. 
CASE NOTES 
stitution, statutes, or case law. The clear distinction drawn by the 
statutes between adoption agreements involving the natural par- 
ents and those involving third parties supports this conclusion. 
Las Vegas Sun is inapposite in a "situation involving an adoption 
agreement between the natural parents of an illegitimate child."3R 
Further, the facts of the instant case meet the requirements of the 
exception permitting parents to profit in limited circumstances. 
Indeed, this exception constitutes the majority rule where there 
exists a compact between natural parents. I t  was, therefore, error 
for the district court to conclude that Nevada would reject the 
majority rule.37 
The Ninth Circuit did not directly respond to the district 
court's discussion of divisibility. It did say, however, that more 
consideration was involved in the case than the mere consent for 
adoption.38 
The Ninth Circuit in the present case confronted one crucial, 
substantive issue: what standard or test should be applied to 
determine the validity of an adoption contract between natural 
parents? Before reaching that issue, however, the court was obli- 
gated to determine whether the law and public policy of the rele- 
vant state jurisdiction, Nevada, already provided clear guidelines 
for resolution of the issue which would preclude a relatively inde- 
pendent federal court consideration of precedents from other ju- 
risdictions and relevant policy. 
This case note will first evaluate the court's resolution of the 
second issue, the presence or absence of controlling Nevada law. 
It will then examine the precedents of other jurisdictions bearing 
on the substantive issue available to the court and the court's use 
of those precedents. Finally, this case note will describe, and 
analyze in some detail, the standard or approach adopted by the 
court for determining the validity of the adoption contract in the 
instant case. 
A. Nevada Law and Public Policy 
The circuit court correctly concluded that the Nevada adop- 
tion statute is not applicable to contracts between the adopted 
36. 512 F.2d at  188. 
37. Id. at 189-90. 
38. Id. at 188. 
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child's natural parents. The legislative history of the act reveals 
that it was intended to eliminate the evils and abuses connected 
with the black market sale of children and especially the presence 
of middlemen or brokers in this baby market.3g This purpose is 
also evident in the language of the act itself. The statute restricts 
the activities of attorneys to prevent them from acting as bro- 
k e r ~ , ' ~  requires persons placing children to be licensed," and pro- 
vides criminal penalties for the placing of children without a 
license and for advertising that children are available for place- 
ment or will be accepted for that p~rpose . '~  On the other hand, 
the exemption of natural parents from the licensing require- 
m e n t ~ , ~ ~  and the waiver of t h e  notification requirement if the 
proposed adoptive parent is related to the child by blood," dem- 
onstrate that contracts between the natural parents or the par- 
ents and a close blood relative of the child are not within the 
intended scope of the statute. 
Although agreements between the natural parents are not 
affected by the statute, the prohibition against the receipt of 
compensation by unlicensed persons could reasonably be applied 
to parents who contract with third parties for the transfer of their 
child's custody. Thus, it may be inferred that Nevada public 
policy prohibits any profit to the parent resulting from the surren- 
der of custody of his child to a stranger. Such a situation is closely 
analogous to the black market situation which the adoption stat- 
utes were designed to prevent. The holding of the Nevada Su- 
preme Court in Las Vegas Sun v. Franklin45 is in accord with this 
39. Mitler, Child Welfare and Adoption in Nevada: A New Law and a New Approach, 
NEVADA LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU BULL. NO. 58, a t  31 (1963): 
The real question is: was the selection of the adoptive home influenced or 
determined by the compensation being given an intermediary of the adoptive 
couple? If the sole reason for selecting an adoptive home was the ability of a 
couple to pay the intermediary one dollar, social damage has been inflicted. 
40. NEV. REV. STAT. 127.285 (1973). 
41. Id. $ 127.310. 
42. Id. 
This statute, read literally, could be applied to the natural parents, but such an 
application would be in conflict with $ 127.240 which exempts the natural parents from 
the licensing requirements. This legislative oversight suggests that the licensing provisions 
of the statute were not intended to apply to agreements between natural parents and that 
the district court incorrectly applied the anti-compensation provisions of $ 127.290. See 
note 26 and accompanying text supra. 
43. See note 25 and accompanying text supra. 
44. See note 27 and accompanying text supra. 
45. 74 Nev. 282,329 P.2d 867 (1958). The court defined a black market sale as follows: 
Under any reasonable construction of the term, "black market sale" contem- 
plates a sale contrary to regulations with a profit calculated either to compen- 
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principle and with the general rule that parents should not be 
permitted to profit from the surrender of their child to a third 
party without reference to the "child's best interests." Neverthe- 
less, the circuit court properly refused to extend the holding of 
Las Vegas S u n  to a situation far removed from the black market 
context, in which the allegations of the plaintiff indicated that  
the welfare of the child was considered by the natural parents and 
in fact promoted by the agreement. 
By determining that neither Nevada's adoption statute nor 
the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Las Vegas Sun  v. 
Franklin controlled in the present case, the court left itself rela- 
tively free to determine the substantive issue concerning the pro- 
per standard to be applied to the alleged contract of adoption. In 
making that determination, the court turned both to precedents 
from other jurisdictions and to public policy. 
B. The  Application of Precedent 
The unique factual setting in the present case made it diffi- 
cult for both the district and the circuit courts to apply precedent. 
The contract involved was more complicated than a simple agree- 
ment between the natural parents for the custody and control of 
their child because the child was born out of wedlock a t  a time 
when the parents were both married to other persons.46 Further- 
more, the courts were unable to find any precedent for a situation 
involving an adoption agreement between the natural parents of 
an illegitimate child in which the parent relinquishing custody 
was monetarily benefited by the contract. 
Although the present case is not precisely similar to any 
other known case, i t  is more closely analagous to those cases, 
relied on by the circuit court, which have established the narrow 
exception permitting parents to incidentally profit from the con- 
tract.47 Like the contracts in those cases, the contract in the pres- 
ent case was a close family compact, which was found to promote 
the welfare of the child; additionally, pecuniary gain was not the 
primary motivation for creation of the contract and surrender of 
child custody. At the same time, the cases relied on by the district 
sate for the risk of apprehension or to match the buyer demand which has 
created the market. 
Id. at 291-92, 329 P.2d at 872. 
46. Letter from Ralph M. Crow, Counsel for Plaintiff, to the Brigham Young Univer- 
sity Law Review, October 2, 1975. 
47. Cases cited note 21 supra. 
592 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
court do not apply as well to the peculiar facts of the present case. 
Those cases involved contracts between the parents and third 
parties, which were either made without reference to the interests 
of the child or by their terms were detrimental to the child's 
welfare? 
In conclusion, the circuit court neither disregarded nor mis- 
applied precedent in formulating its standard for measuring the 
validity of adoption contracts. Rather, the flexible standard 
adopted by the court has some support in prior case law. 
C. T h e  Flexible Standard Adopted by the  N i n t h  Circuit 
While it is well settled that contracts for the sale of children 
are void as against public policy, the courts have disagreed on the 
number and importance of the factors to be considered in arriving 
a t  the conclusion that a sale has occurred. In attempting to arrive 
a t  a result consistent with the underlying rationale and funda- 
mental assumptions of the general policy against sales of chil- 
dren, the circuit court was confronted in the present case with the 
mutually exclusive theories of the district court and the plaintiff. 
The standard adopted by the district court was fairly rigid 
and based entirely on the presence of an economic benefit to the 
parent releasing custody. Under this approach the only relevant 
inquiries are whether there was compensation or a sale price, and 
whether the purpose and effect of the compensation resulted in 
profit to the parent. The existence of a special relationship be- 
tween the parties to the contract and the overall effect of the 
contract on the welfare of the child had no bearing on the court's 
determinati~n.'~ Nevertheless, application of this standard would 
not affect statutory adoptions requiring the consent of parents, or 
incidental contracts exclusively for the benefit of the child, be- 
48. Cases cited note 19 supra. 
Additionally, the circuit court implied that there was an alternative ground for en- 
forcing the contract even if the promise to benefit the mother in return for her consent to 
the adoption was invalid as against public policy. This implication or inference arises from 
both the statement that there "was other consideration for the payment besides mere 
consent to the adoption by the mother" and the court's extended discussion of 
consideration concepts. Further discussion by the court of cases in which the mother was 
able to regain custody following a prior consent to adoption suggests that the plaintiffs 
forbearance to assert her right to reclaim custody of the child was a legal detriment to 
her which created sufficient independent consideration to support the father's promise to 
make a will. 512 F.2d a t  188-89. Such an argument is difficult to support, however, because 
the promise not to regain custody was so closely associated with the consent to adoption 
as  to be almost indistinguishable. 
49. See Civil No. LV-1923, at 5, 7.  
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cause neither of these situations involves a monetary profit to the 
parent. The justification for this approach appears to be that by 
refusing to enforce promises beneficial to the parent the courts 
remove the temptation for parents to sacrifice the "best interests 
of their child" for their own pecuniary advantage." Although this 
rationale is in harmony with the underlying purposes of the pub- 
lic policy, its inflexibility would appear to create a harsh and 
oppressive result in some cases. 
The standard advanced by the plaintiff1 involved a broad 
balancing-of-facts test and lies a t  the opposite end of the spec- 
trum from the profit test utilized by the district court. Under the 
balancing approach, the child's welfare is the ultimate concern, 
and the court is free to examine all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the contract. If the court finds that the contract 
promotes the welfare of the child, it will conclude either that the 
contract is consistent with public policy or that no invalidating 
public policy exists in the particular case.s2 The basis for this 
balancing-of-facts test is the paramount concern for the welfare 
of the child in any case involving child custody. Extrapolating 
this approach to its logical conclusion, if the parent intended to 
sell the child for profit and was solely motivated by this purpose, 
the contract would be enforced if found to promote the child's 
welfare. 
The Ninth Circuit did not adopt either of these two stan- 
dards; rather, it adopted an intermediate approach which it sum- 
marized in these terms: 
It is not against public policy to  enforce an agreement to provide 
for the mother of an illegitimate child in the putative father's 
will, incidental to an agreement to permit the adoption of the 
child by its father, where the adoption was in the best interests 
of the child and pecuniary gain was not the motivating factor 
on the mother's part.53 
This standard permits the court the flexibility necessary to evalu- 
ate all the factors relating to the child's welfare while providing 
important safeguards against abuse by limiting the applicability 
of the test to special fact situations. The contract will be enforced 
- - -- pp 
50. 512 F.2d a t  199 (Koelsch, J., dissenting). The argument is made that financial 
consideration to the mother may "buy a blind spot to qualities in the adoptive parent 
harmful to the child" which is contrary to the responsibility the statutes place on the 
mother to make a wise choice of adoptive parents for her child. 
51. See Brief for Appellant a t  18. 
52. Id. 
53. 512 F.2d at  189. 
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only where it involves a close family compact, actually promotes 
the child's welfare, and is not primarily motivated by the pros- 
pect of pecuniary gain. 
The first condition, that the contract must be a close family 
compact, is not a dispositive factor, but a threshold requirement 
which must be satisfied before the court may look a t  the other 
facts and circumstances in the case. Thus, contracts between 
parents and third parties remain subject to the more rigid "profit 
test" adopted by the district court. There are sound reasons for 
such a distinction. First, common experience indicates that con- 
tracts between parents and strangers are more likely to be 
associated with the evils and abuses of the black market which 
the law attempts to prevent.54 Second, the close relationship of 
the parties to one another and to the child creates a strong infer- 
ence that the welfare of the child was not only considered but was 
the object of the contract. Third, close family members have a 
moral obligation to support the child. Moreover, and this is im- 
portant in the present case, the Nevada statute imposes a corre- 
sponding legal obligation for support on both parents of an illegi- 
timate child." Fourth, in contracts between the natural parents, 
a special relationship is present that is consistent both with the 
public interest in maintaining the natural family relationship and 
with the public policy that favors the support of children by their 
natural fathers." Adoption by the putative father also removes 
the stigma of illegitimacy. 
The second condition in the test adopted by the Ninth Cir- 
cuit is that the contract for adoption or transfer of custody must 
have actually promoted the child's welfare. In determining 
whether this condition has been satisfied, the court should follow 
the extensive fact-finding and balancing process employed in 
hearings for custody or adoption decrees." This inquiry should 
54. Three states do not permit a parent to privately place his child for adoption unless 
the prospective adoptive parent is a close blood relative of the child. CONN. GEN. STAT. 
REV. § 45:63 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, 5 904 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. 4 259.22 
(1974). Arguably, the purpose of these provisions is to control the black market sale of 
children. See also 1 FAMILY LAW REP. 2104 (Dec. 10, 1974). 
55. NEV. REV. STAT. § §  126.030 et seq. (1973). 
56. See Schumm v. Berg, 37 Cal.2d 174, 231 P.2d 39 (1951); Miller v. Miller, 335 
S.W.2d 884 (Ct. App. Ky. 1960); Peterson v. Eritsland, 69 Wash. 2d 588, 419 P.2d 332 
(1966). 
57. While this fact-finding process is the same as if the court were deciding who 
should receive custody of the child, the purpose is different. Since cases involving con- 
tracts incidental to adoption agreements usually arise long after the custody of the child 
has been transferred, the court does not actually protect the welfare of the child in the 
particular case, but rather, uses this as an indication of whether the relinquishing parent 
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include such factors as the financial and social status of the par- 
ties, but neither these nor any other individual factors should be 
given conclusive weight. The obvious weakness in relying 
exclusively on this test is the lack of specific guidelines concern- 
ing the meaning of "best interests." In the present case, however, 
the tremendous financial advantages and apparent social benefits 
accruing to the child by reason of the contract appeared sufficient 
to justify a remand for trial on the merits.5R 
The third condition is that the parent relinquishing custody 
must not be primarily motivated by the prospect of pecuniary 
gain. This means that the welfare of the child must have been 
promoted as the result of a conscious effort on the part of the 
parent to that end, rather than as the by-product of chance or 
good fortune. The purpose of this requirement is to insure that 
the parent surrendering custody has placed the welfare of the 
child above all other considerations and that the prospect of a 
pecuniary advantage has not colored his judgement about the 
welfare of the child." In the present case, the allegation that the 
contract was initiated by the father evidenced a lack of self- 
seeking on the part of the mothera60 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Since public policy should not be applied to invalidate a 
contract unless the effects of the agreement are clearly within the 
intended scope of that policy, the circuit court correctly refused 
to adopt a rigid or blanket test for determining whether contracts 
incidental to adoption agreements between the natural parents 
are contrary to public policy. While profit to the parent should 
sold the child, oblivious to its welfare, or actually entered into the transaction to promote 
the child's welfare. 
58. Oster, supra note 16, a t  22, has attempted to list some of the criteria which courts 
have developed to determine the child's best interests. The list includes: child preference; 
mental and physical health of the child; sex, age, and fitness of the parent including moral 
fitness; love and affection of the parent for the child; and the parent's ability to provide 
for the child physically, mentally, and financially. For a criticism of the court's use of 
these guidelines see note 18 supra. 
Foster & Freed, supra note 18, a t  438, concluded from a study of court decisions that 
the criteria used to determine best interests "are inadequate [because] they fail to force 
courts to consider essential factual, social, medical, and psychological information." For 
a well-written discussion illustrating proper and improper applications of the child's best 
interests standard see Foster, Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child?, 
22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1973). For a discussion of proposed criteria focusing on the child's 
economic and educational security and emotional stability see 34 LA. L. REV. 881 (1974). 
59. See note 50 supra. 
60. 512 F.2d at  189. 
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be considered as one factor in assessing the validity of such agree- 
ments, in cases where the contract promotes the welfare of the 
child, and the mother was not primarily motivated by pecuniary 
gain, courts should be allowed greater flexibility to determine 
whether the incidental profit to the parent falls within the in- 
tended scope of the public policy. This flexible approach is sup- 
ported by sound precedent and, if accompanied by an extensive 
fact-finding process, will serve both to protect the public interest 
against the sale of children and to achieve justice by enforcing 
contracts which do not violate the public policy. In light of the 
increased likelihood, however, that the presence of profit in adop- 
tion contracts with third parties would affect the parent's assess- 
ment of the "best interests of the child," application of the flexi- 
ble standard should be limited, as it was by the circuit court in 
the present case, to cases involving close family compacts. 
